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Abstract
These include a “commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties
of everyone in the community” and eight particular rights are spelled out: the ”complete incorpo-
ration into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights, with direct access
to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including powers for the courts to over-
rule Assembly legislation on the grounds of inconsistency”; a new Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission; a new statutory Equality Commission; a normalization of security arrangements and
practice, including the reduction in the numbers and role of British Armed Forces deployed in
Northern Ireland; an agreement to acknowledge and to address the sufferings of the victims of vi-
olence; and the establishment of an independent commission to make recommendations for future
policing arrangements (currently sitting); and a parallel wide-ranging review of the criminal jus-
tice system. Nevertheless, divisions of this sort are often symptomatic of the absence of a unifying
social solidarity, or of a commonality of aims and aspirations between the communities, and the
absence of procedures or techniques - such as mediation - for combining respect for difference
with a sense of mutual belonging. It is, rather, a realization of the many dimensions of reconcil-
iation and an acknowledgment that personal and social reconciliation is necessary to create new
communities of trust. Programs that help to create trust and seek to transform weak relationships
into trusting ones through a practical and realistic understanding of opposing perceptions are a
necessary precondition to social reconstruction in Northern Ireland society. Participants attended
two seminars at the University of Ulster at Coleraine and spent two weeks in the United States at
Fordham University School of Law, attending lectures and skills training workshops and making
site visits to mediation centers in New York City. Ultimately, however, we felt that the importance
attached to transparency in the procedure and the idea that individuals would have to be moti-
vated to apply would outweigh these possible difficulties. In June 1996, participants came to New
York for a two week period that included study and visits to local mediation centers where various
models of mediation and conflict resolution had been adopted. In Northern Ireland, on the other
hand, the very idea of neutrality implies at best a compromise of integrity and, at worst, ineffectual
behavior. The Culture of Politeness: there is in Northern Ireland a dominant culture of politeness
that inhibits efforts to address difficult issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
In 1998, Good Friday fell on the 10th of April. On the same
day an historic agreement relating to the long-lasting conflict in
Northern Ireland was signed in Belfast by all the involved polit-
ical constituencies (except for two small unionist parties that
had refused to attend the negotiations).' The signatories in-
cluded the leaders of the Irish and British governments, who
had been closely and personally involved in the last stages of the
negotiations; the representatives of all the nationalist parties;
and the representatives of all the major unionist parties.
It was an agreed part of the process that any agreement
reached would be put to the electorates in Northern Ireland and
the Republic of Ireland in the form of referenda and that these
would be quickly followed by an election in Northern Ireland.
The signing of the Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Nego-
tiations ("Agreement" or "Good Friday Agreement") was, there-
fore, followed six weeks later, on May 22, 1998, by two referenda
asking the people living on both parts of the island whether they
supported the proposals contained within the Agreement. The
results were that the proposals received overwhelming support
in both parts of the island. In the North, seventy-one percent of
the electorate voted yes out of a record poll of eighty-one per-
cent, while in the Republic of Ireland, the figure was ninety-four
percent out of a poll of fifty-six percent. The agreed elections
then took place-five weeks after the referenda-on June 25,
1998, and those parties and individuals in support of the Agree-
ment were overwhelmingly successful with over seventy percent
of the votes cast.
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance of this
event. It was the first time since Northern Ireland was formed
* Director, Centre for the Study of Conflict, University of Ulster, Coleraine.
** Associate Professor of Law, Director of Fordham University School of Law Me-
diation Clinic.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998.
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that a majority of both nationalists and unionists had voted in
support of a proposed settlement, and the joint referendum was
thought by some to counter finally the 1918 general election,
which was the last previous time the people on the island of Ire-
land voted as a unit.2
The Agreement, perhaps paradoxically, compels us to re-
flect upon the many difficulties that remain. Its central achieve-
ment has been to establish a set of political compromises, involv-
ing agreed structures and procedures, which the large majority
of the people in Northern Ireland voted to accept in the post-
Agreement referendum. The Agreement, therefore, represents
a workable political settlement mandated by the referendum
vote. The result is that power is being given to the politicians to
control some of the functions of government in Northern Ire-
land.'
This ground-breaking accomplishment nevertheless leaves
many other longstanding difficulties and problems unresolved,
some, if not all, of which result from our common history-be-
cause groups define themselves through history-and the di-
verse ways in which we confront one another with two sets of
memories. The current difficulties with parades, policing, pun-
ishment beatings,4 and decommissioning of weapons are only
the most visible symptoms of these continuing underlying oppo-
sitions within the society.
A. Other Matters Dealt with in the Agreement
The Northern Ireland problem can be conceptualized as an
amalgam of a range of problems-political, social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and historical-all of them a consequence of community
division.5 The political breakthrough on Good Friday deals
2. The 1918 result has always been claimed by republicans as a mandate to speak,
and to act, for the people of Ireland.
3. The hidden agenda is the need to test the concept of power sharing within
government, and so the new Assembly will begin with control of issues such as housing,
health, and education.
4. The debate about the future of policing in Northern Ireland and the very strong
opposition being expressed by Sinn F6in, in particular, and republicans, in general, to
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, are closely related to the current high profile of punish-
ment shootings. The argument is that, in the absence of an acceptable local police
force, the people will go to the paramilitaries for justice.
5. See FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995)
[hereinafter FACETS].
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mainly, and in a substantive way, with the political division only.
The end of violence and the accompanying political accommo-
dations are only the first steps in a long-term process of social
reconstruction.
The Agreement does, however, acknowledge many of the
other difficulties and outlines a set of commitments and agree-
ments relating to matters identified as presenting barriers to
progress. These include a "commitment to the mutual respect,
the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the com-
munity" and eight particular rights are spelled out: the "com-
plete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European
Convention on Human Rights, with direct access to the courts,
and remedies for breach of the Convention, including powers
for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on the grounds of
inconsistency"; a new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commis-
sion; a new statutory Equality Commission; a normalization of
security arrangements and practice, including the reduction in
the numbers and role of British Armed Forces deployed in
Northern Ireland; an agreement to acknowledge and to address
the sufferings of the victims of violence; and the establishment of
an independent commission to make recommendations for fu-
ture policing arrangements (currently sitting); and a parallel
wide-ranging review of the criminal justice system. Finally, with
regard to prisoners, the Agreement proposes an accelerated pro-
gram for the release of prisoners by both governments, and this
part has already been substantially achieved.
In relation to the vexing question of decommissioning of
weapons, the words of the Agreement are that
[a]ll participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to
the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. They
also confirm their intention to work constructively ... and in
good faith with the Independent Commission, and to use any
influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of
all paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement
in referendums North and South ....
The Independent Commission is to monitor, review, and verify
progress.
B. Social Separation
There is a danger, however, that the many entrenched, al-
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beit at times invisible, structural, institutional, and cultural divi-
sions will continue to reinforce the existence of that social dis-
tance and group self-containment that created and sustained the
conflict. Examples of these separations between the two com-
munities include the fact that, for the most part, individuals of
these communities attend separate schools,6 worship in different
churches, read different newspapers, play different games, and
belong to different social and sporting clubs.7 Such associations
and divisions are of great power and significance because they
relate to the ways in-which people identify themselves and their
individual places in the world. The determination to remain dis-
tinctive and separate leads to drawing of boundaries or building
of walls, to marking out territories, and to a physical and emo-
tional distancing from others."
Attempts to change or reform these divisions are resisted,
often for reasons that, in themselves and in other more stable
contexts, are perfectly justifiable. In particular, there is a fear of
assimilation and acculturation, of losing the marks and signals of
identity.9 Such fears often manifest themselves as a search for
confidence in the rituals and practices of the past, such as pa-
rades.1 ° This is particularly true within local communities, small
towns, and villages, including villages within cities, which per-
ceive their position in social and cultural terms as peripheral
and, therefore, threatened. In such contexts, many believe that
the only way to ensure the continuation of a community and a
way of life is to live together separately; this demands segregated
schools, housing estates, and bars. The consequence is that, in a
6. See, e.g., Seamus Dunn, Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland, 15 OXFORD REV.
Enuc. 121 (1989) (describing controlled schools attended mainly by Protestants and
maintained schools as generally attended by Catholics).
7. This statement must be qualified by saying that the degree to which any or all of
these is true varies considerably with respect to such variables as geographical location,
social class, levels of residential segregation, and levels of employment/unemployment.
8. Needless to say, such emotional distancing increases what Elaine Scarry has la-
beled "the difficulty of imagining others" and blocks efforts at collaboration and peace-
making on an interpersonal level. Elaine Scarry, The Difficulty of Imagining Other Persons,
in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE 41 (Eugene Weiner ed., 1998) [herein-
after INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE].
9. For example, the Catholic Church is strongly opposed to the new program of
school integration on religious grounds.
10. DOMINIC BRYAN ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER: CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CON-
FLICT, POLITICAL RITUALS: LOYALIST PARADES IN PORTADOWN (1995); NEILJARMAN &c Do-
MINIC BRYAN, UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER: CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT, PARADE AND
PROTEST: A DISCUSSION OF PARADING DISPUTES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995).
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strong sense, the communities do not know each other. Any one
of these separations by itself would be innocuous and unexcep-
tional, but when the many forms of separation parallel and rein-
force one another, without any other compensatory alignments,
the result is a malign level of suspicion, anxiety, and fear that
almost inevitably leads to violence. The consequences are then
expressed in political terms and the cycle of fear and violence
repeats and reinforces itself.
C. Beyond the Good Friday Agreement
Considerable work remains to be done to establish and to
support practical ways whereby the injurious effects of the range
of divisions in Northern Ireland society can be identified, under-
stood, and ameliorated. It is equally important that such
processes recognize the importance of preserving and even nur-
turing strong cultural, spiritual, and ethnic identities and do not
involve cultural assimilation or the collapsing of identities into a
universal human nature. Nevertheless, divisions of this sort are
often symptomatic of the absence of a unifying social solidarity,
or of a commonality of aims and aspirations between the com-
munities, and the absence of procedures or techniques-such as
mediation-for combining respect for difference with a sense of
mutual belonging. Such divisions ought, therefore, to be consid-
ered dysfunctional, and in need of continuing thought, energy,
and resources.
It would be reductive not to be aware that there are also
some individuals on both sides within Northern Ireland who are
opposed to community cohesion across the divide and who, for a
range of reasons-religion, politics, nationality, history-con-
sider social separation as an important, even necessary, way of
protecting their identity. On one side, therefore, there is a be-
lief that what happened in Northern Ireland over the past thirty
years was a rebellion and that the state ought to have put it down
with all necessary force. And, on the other side, there are those
who think that the war was not over, that they were winning, and
that it should not have been stopped.
It is only by a consideration of these wider contexts that cur-
rent difficulties, for example those concerning parades, can be
understood. The need to win is a matter of fundamental signifi-
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cance: to lose is not just about a parade,11 but about the fear of a
loss of identity, an irreversible movement away from cultural safe
ground. Without this understanding the disputes and argu-
ments seem arcane and atavistic.
II. THE AEED FOR INTEREST-BASED APPROACHES TO
RESOLVING UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
In the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, in addition
to the social separation issues noted earlier, 12 there are many
underlying problems that must still be acknowledged and con-
fronted; human rights, 3 unemployment, and the quality of the
criminal justice system are just a few examples. 4 The reality of
this post-Good Friday Agreement era presents a paradoxical par-
adigm for conflict resolution, one of competing rights and inter-
ests. On the one hand, a rights-based approach to the problems
that afflict Northern Ireland offers ostensible protection to civil
rights and religious liberties of all members of the community.
On the other hand, an interest-based approach seeks to honor
and to maintain human relationships, to accommodate all com-
peting constituencies, and to sustain a commitment to mutual
respect. In our view, the development, support, and sustaining
of interest-based approaches for resolving the continuing under-
lying problems in Northern Ireland society will provide a struc-
tural framework within which rights can be acknowledged and
respected in divided communities. Specifically, we believe that
11. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PARADES AND MARCHES
(The Stationery Office) (1997) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]. In EXECUTIVE SUM-
MAR. INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PARADES AND MARCHES, the authors state that:
[t]he parades issue is a microcosm of the political problems of Northern Ire-
land. It is not new. It is a complex issue that has great capacity to polarize
local communities and the whole of Northern Ireland society. The events of
1996 showed that Northern Ireland remains divided, too often marked by mis-
understanding, mistrust and fear.
Id. at 3.
12. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
13. See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The
Case of Northern Ireland, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1994); Roger Myers, A New Remedy for
Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Con-
flict, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1990).
14. See "Mo" Mowlan Finds 10 Peacemaking Lessons from the Good Friday Negotiations, 16
CONFLICT RESOL. NOTES 25, 26 (1999) (discussing remarks of Dr. Marjorie Mo Mowlan
addressing Fourth European Conference on Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution on
October 12, 1998).
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interest-based approaches such as mediation,15 conciliation,16
consensus building, and collaboration1 7 offer tremendous poten-
tial for the kind of transformation that must occur in human
relationships if rights not only are to be enforced through the
legal system but also are to be fully appreciated and respected in
divided communities.
A. For a Broad Vision of Reconciliation
Reconciliation of the competing interests in Northern Ire-
land's conflicted communities is critically important for any
meaningful social reconstruction to occur.' 8 It requires, above
all, a great deal of thoughtful consideration in constructing a
broad-based design plan for elevating human relationships from
current levels of suspicion, anxiety, and fear to transforming
human relationships based on trust. Our understanding of a
broader vision of reconciliation does not mean forgetting the
past and the injustices suffered by both communities. It is,
rather, a realization of the many dimensions of reconciliation
and an acknowledgment that personal1 9 and social reconcilia-
tion is necessary to create new communities of trust. These are
communities where individuals can participate and fulfill the vi-
sion of justice made possible by the political reconciliation of
15. In a unique way, mediation skills build the consensus that is so necessary to a
new social structure. See Patrick Fn'Piere & Linda Work, Symposium on Emerging Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Systems: On the Growth and Development of Dispute Resolution, 81 Ky.
L.J. 959, 973 (1992-1993) (discussing "the process and attendant skills of mediation that
are being drawn upon to increase citizen participation and build consensus at all levels
of government").
16. Conciliation has been defined as "the psychological component of mediation
in which the third party attempts to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that
is conducive to negotiation." CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTI-
CAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 124 (1986). We include fact finding and isola-
tion issues within the meaning of this process.
17. See WILLIAM R. POTAPCHUK & CAROLINE G. POLK, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION, BUILDING THE COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY 1, 3 (1994) (asserting that
collaboration includes wide spectrum of third party processes including facilitation and
conflict resolution).
18. See, e.g., TIM PAT COOGAN, THE TROUBLES: IRELAND'S ORDEAL 1966-1996 AND
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE XV (1996) (discussing need for reconciliation for success of
peace process.).
19. Personal reconciliation may include a spiritual dimension. See John Paul
Lederach, Beyond Violence: Building Sustainable Peace, in INTERETHNIC COEXISTENCE, supra
note 8, at 236.
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April 10, 1998.20 As Professors McThenia and Shaffer have writ-
ten,
Justice is not the will of the stronger; it is not efficiency in
government; it is not the reduction of violence. Justice is
what we discover-you and I, Socrates said-when we walk
together, listen together, and even love one another, in our
curiosity about whatjustice is and where justice comes from. 21
Finally, with our vision of reconciliation is a recognition of the
intrinsic value of forgiveness and the freedom that comes from
an apology. As former IRA member Shane Paul O'Doherty
wrote in a letter to the New York Times one year after the IRA
cease-fire,
Finally, both sides should apologize for the horrors and
crimes visited on each other and on civilians. Freedom from
the tentacles of my own history came in part from the letters
of apology I wrote to my victims. If we do not admit our sor-
row and our wrongs, if we continue to pursue an eye for an
eye, we will all wind up blind.22
B. The Role of Mediation in Achieving Reconciliation
Mediation is a valuable process for helping to create the
conditions of trust that are necessary for reconciliation. 23  Medi-
ation is an interest-based process of conflict resolution that em-
phasizes the importance of autonomy and self-determination, as
well as the sustaining power of human relationships. Mediation
autonomy operates individually and communally.24 Scholars
have observed that the central quality of mediation is its capacity
to help re-orient parties towards one another, not by imposing
rules upon them, but by helping them to establish, re-establish,
20. See Gerry O'Hanlon, Justice and Reconciliation, in RECONCILIATION IN RELIGION
AND SociETv 48 (Michael Hurley, S.J. ed., 1994).
21. Andrew W. McThenia & Thorns L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660,
1665 (1985).
22. Shane Paul O'Doherty, In the Name of the IR.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1996, at
A21.
23. The value of mediation as a tool of conflict resolution is well known. See, e.g.,
Jacob Bercovitch, Understanding Mediation's Role in Preventive Diplomacy, 12 NEGOTIATION
J. 241 (July 1996).
24. SeeJacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Princi-
ple for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 101, 115-17 (forthcoming
1999) (discussing dimensions of mediation autonomy).
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and restore relationships. 25 The language of mediation focuses
on parties' individual values 26 and interests rather than on the
abstract notion of rights. The process of mediation is directed
towards helping parties understand one another's needs and val-
ues and then focusing on solutions that respond directly to those
interests. 27 The United States' experience with mediation both
in the court system and the private sector has demonstrated a
high degree of compliance and satisfaction with outcomes. 28
There is nothing new about the notion or the practice of
mediation in Northern Ireland. A number of organizations of-
fer mediation either directly or through peace and reconcilia-
tion groups.29 Efforts thus far have been focused on individual
projects, however, and have not focused on institutionalization
in any of the ways that it has occurred in the United States. One
of the challenges for structuring plans for a broad-based vision
of reconciliation is to develop sustained mediation initiatives at
all levels of society where conflict occurs.30
25. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305,
325 (1971). More recently, John Paul Lederach has acknowledged the importance of
relationship development as a "primary essence of mediation." John Paul Lederach,
Exploring the Depths of Mediation: Some Discoveries, 16 CONFLICT RESOL. NOTES 32 (1999).
26. One of the problems with understanding the concept of values in Northern
Ireland is that they have often been used to support the political claims of individual
groups. See MAR FITZDUFF, COMMUNITY CONFLICT SKILLS: A HANDBOOK FOR
GROUPWORK 99 (1988).
27. Examples of current interest-based approaches are the restorative justice move-
ment and victim offender mediation programs. Another example of such approaches
that focus on relationships and changing attitudes and behavior is the community rela-
tions initiative. See, e.g., Colin Knox, Conflict Resolution at the Microlevel: Community Rela-
tions in Northern Ireland, 38J. CONFLICT RESOL. 595 (1994) (reporting achievements dur-
ing four year period of study).
28. For example, see Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective
on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 885 (1998), and
sources cited therein.
29. One example is the Corrymeela Community, a dispersed ecumenical Christian
community founded in 1965. Throughout the period of political violence in Northern
Ireland, the Corrymeela Community has tried to retain an intercommunity and interde-
nominational ethos and practice. Duncan Morrow & Derrick Wilson, Three into Two
Won't Go? From Mediation to New Relationships in Northern Ireland, NATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM, Winter 1993, at 13, 14. See generally Derick Wilson &
Jerry Tyrrell, Institutions for Conciliation and Mediation, in FACETS, supra note 5, at 230.
30. In fact, project members have begun development of individual initiatives
since their return.
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III. IMPLEMENTING MEDIATION: THE NEED TO
DEVELOP TRUST
One of the core values of mediation is trust. Despite all
good intentions on the part of a mediator and/or the parties,
the mediation process will not succeed where there is a lack of
trust. Parade conflicts are a good example. In a recent article
on parade disputes, an experienced mediator in Northern Ire-
land wrote that "mediation (that is, direct contact between the
two parties to discuss their situation in the presence of a media-
tor) is not possible due to the high level of fear and distrust in
the more powerful group."31 This is particularly true when me-
diation is tried, appears to have succeeded, and then fails in its
final outcome. Such frailty must be anticipated in some con-
texts, but in a situation where both sides are determined to win,
an initial positive response to mediation that then fails can be-
come perceived as a weakness and a danger. In addition, where
there is a continuing perception, whether accurate or not, that
much has already been given up, the resulting high levels of sus-
picion can make mediation seem like a plot.32
The lack of trust between the divided communities of
Northern Ireland is well noted.33 Mediation, however, is a pro-
cess that depends upon consent of the governed, a consent that
comes from trust. 4 Both communities must trust whatever me-
diative processes are established. What Professor John Hart Ely
has observed about democracy is equally true of mediation and
other interest-based processes of conflict resolution, namely,
that "[m]alfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of
trust, when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political
31. Joseph Peake, A Parades Dispute in a Border Village in Northern Ireland, 15 CON-
FLICT RESOL. NOTES 36, 37 (1998).
32. The history of the Northern Ireland conflict contains many examples of words
and language that have become devalued and instinct with suspicion as a consequence
of perceived failure and resulting suspicion.
33. See, e.g., Dick Spring, Gaining the Consent of the Governed: A Prerequisite to Peace in
Northern Ireland, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 6 (1994).
34. See William Ross & Jessica LaCroix, Multiple Meanings of Trust in Negotiation The-
ory and Research: A Literature Review and Integrative Model, 7 INT'LJ. CONFLICT MGMT. 314
(1996); see also Bernard Mayer, The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation, 17
MEDIATION Q. 75 (1987) (asserting that mediator's power over process derives from
parties' consent).
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change to ensure that they will stay in and. the outs will stay out
"35
Programs that help to create trust and seek to transform
weak relationships into trusting ones through a practical and re-
alistic understanding of opposing perceptions are a necessary
precondition to social reconstruction in Northern Ireland soci-
ety. In the following part, we discuss ajoint endeavor to develop
such a program.
V. THE FORDHAM/ULSTER CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PROJECT DEVELOPING TRUST THROUGH COLLABORATION
The authors conducted a three-year conflict resolution pro-
ject in Northern Ireland and in the United States pursuant to a
grant from the United States Information Agency.3 6 We believe
that some of the lessons that we learned from this endeavor may
be helpful to others in developing program models that can
help to sustain an environment for peace and positive, trans-
formative reconstruction in Northern Ireland. Only through
sustained initiatives will we be able to work through the difficult
problems that remain with parades, policing, punishment beat-
ings, and decommissioning.
A. Background
How disputes get resolved says much about the qualitative
level of coexistence in a society, particularly a divided one such
as Northern Ireland. The purpose of our project was to train
citizen leaders from Northern Ireland in conflict resolution and
mediation skills that would be helpful in resolving the ordinary
disputes of their workplace and communities. We believed that
such training would have a positive, spillover effect on the larger
issues created by sectarianism, as the everyday "micro" disputes
of daily life are often a metaphor for the larger macro issues
affecting society. Our goal was to bring together leading citizens
from both of the divided communities who would return to
Northern Ireland and make a positive contribution to social re-
construction. Our program was designed to provide an intro-
duction to a range of theoretical perspectives on mediation and
alternative dispute resolution skills. It sought to provide practi-
35. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980).
36. United States Information Agency, Grant No. 25-07-2165.
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cal illustrations of the implementation of mediation programs
relevant to the needs of members of the group,37 and, finally, it
offered a basis for practical development work to be carried on
by members of the group after their return to Northern Ire-
land."8 Participants attended two seminars at the University of
Ulster at Coleraine and spent two weeks in the United States at
Fordham University School of Law, attending lectures and skills
training workshops and making site visits to mediation centers in
New York City.
B. Selection of Participants
Considerable care was given to the method of selecting par-
ticipants for the workshop because Northern Ireland is a small
and closely interconnected society and the professional and
community networks are correspondingly on a small scale. Per-
sonal contact and recommendation can produce closed groups
and suspicions of patronage, all of which work against trust
building. We saw transparency in the selection process as cen-
tral, and it was eventually decided that this transparency could
best be achieved through a completely open public advertise-
ment and subsequent selection on standardized criteria. An
identical notice was, therefore, placed in each of the three main
daily newspapers that have a Northern Ireland wide circulation:
The Belfast Telegraph, which has a broadly cross-community
readership; the Irish News, which has a mainly Catholic/nation-
alist readership; and the News Letter, which has a mainly Protes-
tant/unionist readership.
The advertisement gave a very brief outline of the project
and asked those interested in applying to contact the Centre for
the Study of Conflict at the University of Ulster at Coleraine. We
recognized that this procedure had potential pitfalls. It was un-
clear whether people would apply on this basis, whether it would
37. In designing the program, we were conscious of the need to develop a cultur-
ally specific model and not import the U.S. version of mediation. See JOHN PAUL LEDER-
ACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES (1995).
38. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Professor Valerie
Morgan, Research Director of the Initiative on Conflict Resolution and Ethnicity (IN-
CORE), University of Ulster, Magee College, who conducted the evaluation of this pro-
ject. Her evaluation model was ongoing throughout the project. This allowed us, and
the participants, to have ongoing feedback, and it provided a summary evaluation for
the founders. The elements of formative evaluation were designed to support the con-
cept of joint ownership between providers and participants.
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produce a cross-section of applicants from target groups, and
whether it would be possible to assemble a group balanced by
age, gender, geographical location, and professional and com-
munity involvement using standardized criteria. Ultimately,
however, we felt that the importance attached to transparency in
the procedure and the idea that individuals would have to be
motivated to apply would outweigh these possible difficulties.
After extensive interviews conducted at the Centre for the Study
of Conflict, twenty-one individuals were chosen to participate.
The group was representative of both communities and had al-
most equal proportions in respect of other variables such as gen-
der, age, and geographical residence within Northern Ireland.
The final group of twenty-one included individuals in the follow-
ing occupations and professions: social workers, prison gover-
nor, training officer for youth, principal of primary integrated
school, community development worker, community relations
Officers, resident magistrate, legal officer, education officer-
Community Relations, advice officer, Fair Employment Commis-
sion member, RUC inspector, civil servant, solicitor, and director
of a school mediation project.
C. Course of Study
We began the project with two seminars conducted at the
University of Ulster at Coleraine. This introduction gave the
participants an opportunity to begin developing social relation-
ships with one another, to establish ground rules for their own
behavior, and to share with-us and with one another their expec-
tations for the learning that was to take place. These meetings
were critical to the success of the project and they established
collaboration as the preferred model of behavior.
At the first seminar we asked the participants to identify crit-
ical issues for consideration in the skills training workshops.
Many of them believed that if a new era of peace would in fact
unfold as a result of the IRA cease-fire of August 31, 1994, there
had to be a new vocabulary. Language and its meaning assumed
a great deal of importance for the group, and they identified the
following words on which there should be common understand-
ing before the workshop should proceed: community, mixed
community, cross-community, sectarianism, tradition, neutral,
law, and prejudice. Working in small groups, they discussed
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their understanding of these words and then shared them with
the whole group. Some of the agreed upon definitions were en-
lightening. Tradition was defined by one group as "anything
that happens more than twice in Northern Ireland and is linked
to an earlier period in a group's history." In response to the
word "neutral," one group stated that "a car in neutral isn't go-
ing anywhere." We assigned several readings on conflict resolu-
tion theory, negotiation, and mediation. 9 Finally, the group
agreed upon seven rules that would govern their behavior
throughout the workshop: (1) listen while others are talking,
(2) show respect for all, (3) everyone is encouraged to speak, but
no pressure to do so, (4) be open minded, (5) no volunteering
others, (6) no putdowns, and (7) confidentiality.4 ° Most group
members were concerned with their personal safety and, there-
fore, confidentiality was quite important to them.
In June 1996, participants came to New York for a two week
period that included study and visits to local mediation centers
where various models of mediation and conflict resolution had
been adopted.4' We used a theory/practice model, with lec-
tures, skills development workshops, role playing problems, vide-
otaping, and critique followed by site visits for process observa-
tion. Classes were conducted by eminent mediation and conflict
resolution academics and practitioners in the United States.42
For two weeks the group lived as a community, working, study-
ing, and socializing together. Many of them came to know each
other in ways that would not have been possible in Northern Ire-
land.
Over the last two years, several members of the project have
been meeting regularly in Belfast pursuing a number of media-
tion endeavors including a pilot court mediation project.
39. Readings included Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of
the Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 235 (1993), and Jeffrey
Z. Rubin, Conflict from a Psychological Perspective, in NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MU-
TUAL GAIN 135 (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993).
40. The rules were developed and agreed upon on May 24, 1996.
41. Visits were arranged depending on the professional background of the partici-
pants. Thus, there were visits to schools, court programs, therapy centers, and media-
tion centers.
42. We were privileged to have the assistance of Professors Nancy Rogers, Leonard
Riskin, Maria Volpe, Margaret Shaw, Miguel Hernandez, and Thomas Colosi to lead
major workshops.
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D. Lessons Learned
1. Neutrality
Almost every mediation text assumes that mediator neutral-
ity is an absolute requirement." While a number of recent stud-
ies suggest that neutrality as practiced in mediation may in fact
be more a question of degree than one of absolutes,44 it is still
accepted as the normative model. At the very least, the appear-
ance of neutrality is a governing norm.
In Northern Ireland, on the other hand, the very idea of
neutrality implies at best a compromise of integrity and, at worst,
ineffectual behavior. Neutrality is a suspect concept in Northern
Ireland."5 The starkest reminder of this fact is the definition of
neutrality offered by one of the participants in the project, that
"a car in neutral isn't moving." Morrow and Wilson suggest that
there is a cynicism about the neutrality of internal mediators and
the possibility of their existence.46 At a Human Rights Sympo-
sium held at Fordham University School of Law on February 28,
1997, Angela Hegarty, from the University of Ulster, Magee Col-
lege remarked that "everyone is biased. It's impossible to be
neutral."47
As interest-based programs are developed in this society di-
vided along sectarian lines, we need further thoughtful consider-
43. See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984). The authors define mediation
as a "process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person
or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider
alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs." Id.
at 7; see CHRISTOPHER MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR
RESOLVING CONFLICT 14 (1987) (stating that "[m]ediation is the intervention into a
dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial, and neutral third party").
44. Sara Cobb &Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Medi-
ation, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 5 (1991).
45. This is true of other societies plagued by conflict, such as South Africa. Chris-
topher Moore writes that:
[i]n many conflict-ridden societies, members cannot conceive of a person who
is outside of the conflict, and they see third parties as either allies or enemies.
Such was the case in South Africa in 1989, when conflicting groups could not
imagine any South African playing a neutral, impartial or a mediating role in
dismantling apartheid.
Christopher Moore, "Have Process, Will Travel": Reflections on Democratic Decision Making
and Conflict Management Practice Abroad, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FORUM, Winter 1993, at 1, 9.
46. Morrow & Wilson, supra note 29, at 13.
47. Notes on file with the authors.
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ation about the relevance and meaning of neutrality in conflict
resolution processes.
2. The Culture of Politeness
There is in Northern Ireland a dominant culture of polite-
ness that inhibits efforts to address difficult issues. Communities
do not really know each other notjust because they continue on
with segregated housing estates, schools, and bars, but because
they avoid confronting the real divide in common conversation
with each other. As Morrow and Wilson have observed, "[w] e
often prefer to remain apart or to meet politely avoiding any-
thing that touches on the dominant societal contest."4
The reality of this politeness culture became quite apparent
while group members were attending the New York workshops at
Fordham Law School. During this period of time, newspapers
reported considerable activity in Northern Ireland with parade
fever mounting.49 The agenda for the first week of training in-
cluded workshops on -identifying and confronting sources of
community conflict, protecting scapegoats in the community,
and peace building. In group discussions, however, no one ever
referenced or mentioned the conflict "back home" in Northern
Ireland. They simply did not want to talk about it with one an-
other.5 ° Certainly, all members of the group felt a keen sense of
what was happening in their own country, but they did not want
to be told to engage in discussions about the problems of sectari-
anism.5a Not until about one week had passed did such discus-
48. Morrow & Wilson, supra note 29, at 13.
49. Consider what happened at the Drumcree parade shortly after participants re-
turned home. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PARADES AND MARCHES,
reports that:
[tihe dispute in the summer of 1996 between the Loyal Orders and National-
ist resident groups, which required major intervention by the police under the
public order legislation, brought Northern Ireland close to anarchy ...
There were major costs to Northern Ireland: two deaths and a significant
number of injuries, polarisation between the two parts of the community,
damage to the relationship between the police and the community, public
expenditure costs of at least £ 30 million, losses to trade, tourism and inward
investment.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 11, at 1.
50. Some group members did not object to talking with U.S. newspapers. SeeJack
Holland, Where and how the peace process went astray, IRISH ECHO, July 10-16, 1996, at 10.
51. During one of the de-briefings following the workshop, group members told us
that they appreciated that they were not required to discuss this topic, but were allowed
to let discussion develop when they were comfortable with it.
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sions develop as a natural outgrowth of conversations about how
difficult it would be to resolve disputes at home where some peo-
ple do not even think that sectarianism is a problem. In a later
small group discussion about the transformative aspects of medi-
ation, some members emphasized the need for conciliation
before any real reconciliation could occur "back home." Concil-
iation as a method of conflict resolution requires articulating
facts and identifying issues, activities that might undercut habits
of avoidance. The culture of politeness, a persistent presence in
Northern Ireland society, must be acknowledged and under-
stood if we are to have a better appreciation of the conditions for
reconciliation and effective mediative approaches in Northern
Ireland.
CONCLUSION
That conflicts remain in Northern Ireland after the Good
Friday Agreement is inevitable. But the Agreement gives us
hope that a community with two sets of memories will no longer
continue blindly in avoidance and violence, but will begin to en-
gage in the difficult conversations that lead to true reconcilia-
tion.
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